1.4 The amounts that the delegate can compensate the claimant under this agreement; and 1.2 the levy [contribution to the provider`s overhead and profits]; Despite the obvious benefits, the parties must be aware of the potential difficulties encountered in the allocation of alliances. It seems that this type of agreement is best suited to situations where service providers are of similar size. If there is a dominant service provider in an alliance, this can have an impact on the impartiality of important decisions. Managing an alliance contract can also be difficult in situations where a large number of parties are involved. . Practical Benefits of the Painshare/Gainshare Payment Model The next article in this series takes into account the no-blame/no fault culture of alliance contracts, in which the parties agree not to complain if there is a problem. As part of a traditional approach to the allocation of services, a contract is usually initiated by a commissioner who explains what he is asking for. A service provider (or a number of service providers) will then launch a tender for its solution and offer a price for its delivery. The agreed final price is the result of the risk assessment associated with the completion of the final solution. This „painshare/gainshare“ payment model aims to promote a winning game,lose:lose mind set. All participants win or lose, as can be the case. The common financial incentive for a project to achieve clearly defined objectives promotes the collective approach, which is essential for the attribution of alliances.
In addition, the „breadshare“ aspect of an alliance contract may deter providers from fully participating in a project. In a traditional contract, service providers will be exposed to the magnitude of the risk. However, in an alliance agreement, the consequences of a bad outcome are shared among allies. As a result, service providers do not allocate their strongest resources to an alliance contract and instead identify their best-performing companies for higher-risk projects. Alliance members set performance indicators. These are often agreed results, whether it is the timely delivery of certain standards or delivery, and the focus will be on the project that will achieve these defined and cross-cutting objectives. It is only when these results are achieved that Alliance members will be able to benefit from a financial bonus. Alliance parties can, at the beginning of the project, release funds to reward Alliance parties for exceeding performance indicators. On the other hand, if the parties of the alliance do not achieve the results agreed in advance, they will share the financial burden.
It promotes a high performance culture. Commissioners must therefore ensure that risk and compensation plans include sufficient „benefits“ to eliminate the potential complacency of service providers because of a lower risk. In projects where service delivery is more complex and the level of risk is difficult to predict, service providers generally tend to include a „risk value“ in their initial courses. As a result, for many fixed-price contracts, service providers are increased to compensate for the perceived level of risk.