In American public opinion, support for trade agreements such as the WTO and NAFTA is low. For example, a March 2016 Bloomberg Politics poll showed that 65% of respondents felt that the U.S. should have more import restrictions, while only 22% think there should be fewer restrictions. And a June 2015 CNBC poll showed that 50% of respondents think our trade agreements have more drawbacks than benefits, and only 42% think there are more benefits.  Two years later, in June 1990, U.S. President George H.W. Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas initiative, which provided for a possible free trade agreement from Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego. The objectives of these negotiations were based on both foreign and trade policy considerations. From a trade perspective, the U.S. Free Trade Area (CTA) would open up important markets, including Brazil and Argentina. From a foreign policy perspective, it was anticipated that a free trade agreement would promote stability and democracy in the Southern Islands of the United States.
Regional trade agreements (RTA) around the world have multiplied since the early 1990s. Many members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) focus on regional or bilateral free trade agreements as a key component of their foreign and trade policy1. Mexico is a member of the WTO, which allows members to conclude regional trade integration agreements under certain conditions set by specific WTO rules2 Within the administration, the President defines the general parameters of the U.S. approach to trade policy, including the negotiation of trade agreements, within the constraints imposed by his legislative mandate. Until 1963, the Department of Foreign Affairs was the most important authority responsible for the management of trade policy under the leadership of the President. However, under pressure from Congress, President Kennedy created a new office of the Special Representative for Trade (STR) at the White House. At the time, Congress believed that the State Department was not paying enough attention to U.S. business interests. The intention of the new office was to have a balance between American trade, foreign policy and other interests.
 Congress delayed the adoption of agreements with South Korea, Colombia and Panama by several years, forcing the government to go back and negotiate some amendments to those agreements. The reality is that some important parts of the private sector must aggressively and effectively campaign for the approval of the agreement and minimize the resistance of important segments if the agreement is to be approved by Congress. Based on the kennedy Round experience, in which Congress refused to adopt an element of the negotiated package, the U.S. trading partners had made it clear that they would not enter into negotiations unless the United States gave better guarantees that the whole package would be adopted.